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Administrative Law News

including the substantive changes from the previous
effective version as well as any changes occurring from
the proposed to the fmal version of the regulation.
Notice requirements of the Administrative Process Act
(§9.6.14:1 et seq. of the Code ofVtrginia), including
the summary, basis, and impact statements and the
economic impact analysis and agency response are also
printed in the Vilginia Register. With the arrival of the
VAC, the Vitginia Register will no longer print the full
text of an amended regulation. Only the text of the
section being altered will appear in the Virginia
Register.
Another useful resource to use in conjunction with the
VA C is the Administrative Law Appendix. Lawyers
Cooperative Publishing is also producing this soft
bound compilation. Enclosed with each printed set of
the VAC this reference is an excellent starting point for
any re~atory research. The Administrative Law
Appendix contains a resume of each agency's
responsibilities and the statotory authority that enables
the agency to promulgate and enforce their regulations.
Each copy contains a listing of each agency's operative
regulations, along with regulatory forms and documents
incorporated by reference. Individual copies of the
Administrative Law Appendix are available from the
publisher.
The VAC contains the full text of most agency
regulations. However, to harness the rapidly growing
size of the compilation, the Code Commission granted
some exceptions. Subject areas regulated identically by
the Commonwealth and the federal government do not
receive full text coverage. However, these duplicate
regulations do acquire a VAC number and are listed in
chart format within the VAC. The end of each chapter
contains a list of regulatory forms and documents
incorporated by reference within the regulation. The
Office of the Registrar can provide copies of these
forms and documents.
The Vtrginia Administrative Code will provide greater
accessibility to the regulations of the Commonwealth's
agencies. Look for future articles in this newsletter
providing timesaving tips for conducting research with
the printed text and the CD-ROM product.
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J. W Burress, Inc. v. Department ofMotor Vehicles,

decided by the Circuit Court for the Twenty-Third
Circuit (Roanoke) in January, will soon appear in
Volume 37 of Hamilton Bryson's Circuit Court
Opinions. It involves judicial review of a decision by
the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles pursuant .to
Article 7 of the Virginia Motor Vehicle Dealers Act,
Va. Code § 46.1-1500 et seq. The facts are as follows.
With dealerships in Roanoke, Norfolk, and Gainesville,
Burress sold street sweepers and their parts for the
Elgin Sweeper Company. By a 1993 contract, Elgin
designated for Burress an "area of primary sales
responsibility" that included all of Virginia and part of
North Carolina. ln 1994, Elgin informed Burress that
Elgin was establishing another dealership, in Richmond.
Burress objected, applying to the Commissioner for a
hearing under Article 7 of the Dealers Act, which
authorizes the Commissioner, at the behest of an
existing franchised dealer, to review new franchises in
"the relevant market area," and to require reasonable
evidence that the market will support all the dealers of
that line of motor vehicles in the area. ln this case, a
hearing officer determined Burress's "relevant market
area" to be the area of primary sales responsibility
agreedupon by Burress and Elgin in their contract, i.e.,
all of Vtrginia. The hearing officer also reported that
the record contained no evidence to support a finding
that Vtrginia could support two Elgin Sweeper dealers.
Afterwards, the Commissioner declined to adopt the
hearing officer's choice of a market area, ruling instead
that, because Burress's dealership was located in
Roanoke, and because the statute defined relevant
market area as within a radius of fifteen miles of the
existing dealership, a Richmond dealership would not
be located in Burress's relevant market area. Since,
according to the Act, the new dealership would not
encroach, Burress was not entitled to a hearing under
the Act. Burress appealed to the circuit court.
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At th~ time, the Dealers Act offered three different
definitions of "relevant market area" for use in
adjudicating disputes between dealers and franchising
manufacturers. The definitions varied according to the
density of population around the site of the complaining
dealership. For disputes triggered by an attempt on the
part of a manufacturer to put another dealership in the
area, the Act defmed relevant market area using a tenmile radius in localities with populations of 250,000 or
more, a fifteen-mile radius in localities with populations
between 150,000 and 250,000, and either a twenty-mile
radius or "the area of responsibility defmed in the
franchise," whichever is greater, elsewhere. (For any
other dispute covered by the Act, the relevant market
areas was, regardless of the locality's population, either
a twenty-mile radius or the area of responsibility
defmed in the franchise.)
The circuit court vacated and remanded, finding that the
Commissioner's decision that Burress was not entitled
to a hearing by the Commissioner was not supported by
substantial evidence. According to the court, the record
was devoid of any evidence at all to support the
conclusion that Burress's dealership was located only in
Roanoke, especially when Elgin Sweeper had conceded
before the court that Burress had dealerships in Norfolk,
Gainesville, and Roanoke. Treating the Commissioner's
decision that Burress's market area was centered in
Roanoke as a fmding of fact reviewed by reference to a
substantial evidence standard, the court had no trouble
setting it aside.
In court, both sides agreed that Burress had dealerships
in three locations: Roanoke, Norfolk, and Gainesville,
and Elgin conceded that the record before the
Commissioner proved as much. The court's opinion is
therefore disingenuous at best in stating that the record
before the Commissioner contained no support for the
Commissioner's factual determination that Burress's
dealership is in Roanoke. The record indeed supported
a fmding that Burress deals in Roanoke; the real
problem was that the record also proved Burress deals
at two other locations as well. What therefore had to be
considered by the Commissioner (and, later, the court)
was how proof of three dealing locations could sustain
a decision to treat Burress's relevant market area as
related only to one. This is not an issue of fact,
Norfolk, VIrginia 235 a mixed question oflaw and fact,
but a question solely of law: how § 46.1-1500 applies
to any dealership operating in more than one location.
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When the court's opinion re-characterized the fatal
failure in the Commissioner's record as the absence of
any evidence to support the proposition that Burress
sold Elgin products only from one location, the opinion
implied such a condition is to be found in the statute. To
the contrary, such a condition is not explicitly set forth
in The Dealers Act. Indeed,§ 46.1-1500 opens with the
proviso that the specific decisions which follow apply
"[unless the context otherwise requires." Whether the
condition that, for one dealership, several sites must be
treated separately, should be found in§ 46.1-1500 by
implication is another matter, leading inexorably to the
tricky question of who gets to decide what the General
Assembly would have wanted, i.e., what should be
implied. Here, faced with a situation not explicitly
addressed in the Act, the circuit court expressed no
reservations about substituting its own view of what a
relevant market area ought to be for that of the
Commissioner, notwithstanding the general intention of
the General Assembly, made clear in the very existence
of the Act, that disputes of this sort are better handled
by the Commissioner than by the courts.
The Dealers Act has since been substantially amended,
but it still offers three alternatives for defining the
relevant market area when a dealer and his or her
franchising manufacturer clash: a territory defined in the
franchise agreement, a circle with a radius varying
according to population density, or something else
altogether, when "the context otherwise requires. The
Act still dictates how to choose between the territory
described in the franchise and the circle --whichever
produces the larger area. However, the Act still does not
say when the context otherwise requires, so that neither
applies. More importantly, in the absence of any
criterion, the Act is still silent as to who gets to decide.
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